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Abstract
Today, the notion of transnational, or sometimes transsystemic, law has progressed well be-
yond Jessup’s concept. It now includes the international law that Jessup generally dealt with –
the (often) national law regulating actions or events that transcend national frontiers – but also
now clearly extends to law that is transnational in origin, as opposed to application. The new
transnational law can thus be applied to purely internal, and not only international, cases, and its
transnational character is derived from the extra-national character of its source or sources. It is
often seen in the form of “general principles of law,” which transcend the law of any nation-state
or regional or international organization. It is law which is not formal in character, not formally
endorsed by a state prior to its application within the state, not systemic or positive in character. It
represents a major theoretical and highly practical challenge to concepts of law that have prevailed
for the last two centuries. What theoretical and historical justification can be offered for it? In
attempting a response to this large question, an initial field of inquiry must relate to the justifica-
tions offered for the exclusivity of state law. If exclusive state law is of only one or two centuries’
duration, what preceded it? Are there notions of law which have been overlooked or pushed aside
in the process of state construction which are once again relevant in a period of state decline? This
article answers these questions.
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The search for transnational law is hampered by the idea
that the source of all law is the nation-state.1 Though the idea is
relatively new, having been with us for only the last century or
two, it has been remarkably dominant in legal theory and has
had considerable, though variable, effect on legal practice
throughout the world. Since the state would be the source of all
law, law beyond the state would be law to which the state con-
sented ("positive" sovereignty), so the most obvious form of "in-
ternational" law would be in the form of state contracts or trea-
ties. Absent such formal national consent, "international" law,
for many, would not be law properly so called. Private interna-
tional law would have escaped this fatal flaw only by becoming
national in character, a national law dealing with international
cases.
When PhilipJessup proposed the idea of "transnational" law
in the mid-twentieth century, he may not have been attempting
much more than a neologism.2 He was concerned only with law
that "regulates actions or events that transcend national fron-
tiers," and his discussion turned entirely around questions of
public and private international law as classically defined.3 A
residual category of "other rules" would have applied to relations
between private persons or corporations and foreign states; Jes-
sup's background in public international law is evident in his dif-
ficulty in qualifying such relations as "international," because
they were not between "nations."4 Nothing injessup's treatment
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1. See PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw 2 (1956). In accordance with the argu-
ment of this Essay, the words "nation" and "state" are not capitalized, as a means of
resisting reificiation, objectivization, and closure.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
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of the subject was incompatible, however, with nineteenth- and
twentieth-century ideas of the state as the exclusive source of law.
Today, however, the notion of transnational, or sometimes
transsystemic, law has progressed well beyond Jessup's concept.
5
It now includes the international law thatJessup generally dealt
with-the (often) national law regulating actions or events that
transcend national frontiers-but also now clearly extends to law
that is transnational in origin, as opposed to application. The
new transnational law can thus be applied to purely internal, and
not only international, cases, and its transnational character is
derived from the extra-national character of its source or
sources. It is often seen in the form of "general principles of
law," which transcend the law of any nation-state or regional or
international organization. It is law which is not formal in char-
acter, not formally endorsed by a state prior to its application
within the state, not systemic or positive in character. It repre-
sents a major theoretical and highly practical challenge to con-
cepts of law that have prevailed for the last two centuries. What
theoretical and historical justification can be offered for it? In
attempting a response to this large question, an initial field of
inquiry must relate to the justifications offered for the exclusivity
of state law. If exclusive state law is of only one or two centuries'
duration, what preceded it? Are there notions of law which have
been overlooked or pushed aside in the process of state con-
struction which are once again relevant in a period of state de-
cline?6
I. THE EXCLUSIVITY OF STATE LAW
Contemporary legal positivists, the theorists of national le-
gal systems, treat state law as fact.7 They argue that state law has
5. See H. Patrick Glenn, A Transnational Concept of Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF LEGAL STUDIES 839, 846-47 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003) [hereinafter
Glenn, Transnational Concept].
6. See generally MARTIN L. vAN CREvELD, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE STATE (1999)
(observing that many existing states are combining into larger communities or disinte-
grating); see also PHILIP BOaBrr, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE
OF HISTORY 237, 241, 337 (2003) (noting the declining role of the state in matters of
internal security and welfare, and characterizing the state as not withering away but
undergoing historical change). The designation "state," as applied to abstract political
units, came into use in the first half of the seventeenth century. See id. at 95.
7. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 116 (1994) (delineating minimum
conditions for "the existence of a legal system").
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been formally enacted, in structured and systemic form, and that
it has engendered, in the argument of Herbert Hart, a social fact
of obedience.' Hans Kelsen spoke of the necessary efficiency of
the national legal system.9 In itself, the national legal system
would give rise to no obligation to obey the law.1" It simply exists
as fact, and facts cannot give rise to obligations. So long as the
national legal system is factually efficient, however, people will
tend to obey it, realizing that disobedience may attract sanctions
for targeted behavior, even if one cannot speak of obligation.
Moreover, the nature of a national legal system is one of exclu-
sivity. Hart spoke of "a certain kind of supremacy within its terri-
tory and independence of other systems."" Kelsen spoke of the
relations between "norm systems" as being either those of inde-
pendence or subordination.1 2 More recently, Joseph Raz has ex-
plained that "[a] 11 legal systems ... are potentially incompatible
at least to a certain extent. Since all legal systems claim to be
supreme with respect to their subject-community, none can ac-
knowledge any claim to supremacy over the same community
which may be made by another legal system. 13 All legal systems
would thus be, in principle, exclusive and closed. The open le-
gal system would be one which controlled its own boundaries
and which would admit, exceptionally and according to its own
criteria, the application of "foreign" law.
There are of course very profound reasons for the recalci-
trance of legal systems before other potential sources of internal
law, which are rooted in the positive or factual character of the
legal system. If a national legal system is to apply law other than
its own, in circumstances where its own law does not so provide,
there must be reasons for doing so. What could these reasons
be? They are reasons that suggest that the legal system should
not be applicable in certain cases. They are reasons which go to
the justification for legal systems, for the justification of their
content, and for their exclusivity. Yet the theory of positive or
8. See id. ("[R]ules of behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate
criteria of validity must be generally obeyed .... ").
9. See HANS KELSEN, PuRE THEORY OF LAW 115-16 (1967) (describing the notion of
obligation as being "fundamentally" connected with that of sanction).
10. SeeJosEPH RAz, The Obligation to Obey the Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAw: ESSAYS
ON LAW AND MoRALITY 233 (1979) ("[T]here is no obligation to obey the law.").
11. HART, supra note 7, at 24 (emphasis in original).
12. See KELSEN, supra note 9, at 330, 332.
13. RAz, supra note 10, at 119.
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formal legal systems purports only to describe these systems as
social facts, not to justify them. There can be no reasons for
adherence or non-adherence to a legal system according to de-
scriptive or analytical theory. Social facts do not give reasons for
their own rejection or adoption. There is corresponding resis-
tance to the idea that legal systems can exist as a matter of de-
gree, since the existence of degrees would require explanation
or justification. 4 The national legal system thus exists, as a kind
of large, dumb animal which displaces all other legal animals
within its territory, unless it leaves space for them because of
their utility. The hippopotamus comes to mind.
The factual character of legal systems has today become,
however, a very difficult proposition to accept, given the wide
variety of states in the world, their relative efficacy, and wide-
spread corruption in the administration of justice. We now
know "failed" or "dysfunctional" states, and the expression "post-
legal" has been used in describing some of these situations. a5
Such states do not produce social facts of obedience, but "paper
law" and "paper rights."1 6 Even within long-standing states of
unquestioned efficacy, new demands are being made for accom-
modation of different forms of (non-state) normativity.' 7 So the
factual explanation for national legal systems is now being factu-
14. See, e.g., Klaus Ffisser, Farewell to "Legal Positivism": The Separation Thesis Unravel-
ling, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 119, 155 n.17 (Robert P.
George ed., 1996) (listing references, for legal philosophers who "cling dogmatically to
classificatory ideas," and reject the analysis of legal systems as matters of degree). For
the presumption of completeness of national legal systems, see HENRI BATIFFOL, AS-
PECTS PHILOSOPHIQUES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVP 16, 24 (1956).
15. See Keith Culver, Leaving the Hart-Dworkin Debate, 51 U. TORONTO L.J. 367, 395
(2001) ("Some of the most exciting questions and sweeping empirical changes in life
under law today are found in precisely these borderline cases."); see also Ruth Gordon,
Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 903,
913-23 (1997) (discussing failed and dysfunctional states); Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, Of
Collapsed, Dysfunctional and Disoriented States: Challenges to International Law, 47 NETH.
INT'L L. REV. 53, 58-60 (2000) (highlighting the difference between a collapsed state
and a failed state). There is also a phenomenon of legal systems failing within existing
states. For an explanation of this phenomenon in Indonesia, see Adijaya Yusuf, Integrat-
ing the Country Through Legal Reform: The Indonesian Experience, in LAW IN A CHANGING
WORLD: ASIAN ALTERNATrVES 110, 113 (Morigiwa Yasutomo ed., 1998) ("Although steps
have been taken, law development has not yet been able to formulate a national legal
system.").
16. See WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL SS-
TEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA 202 (2000).
17. SeeJAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY' CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF Di-
vERsrn 1-29 (1995) (examining claims for recognition of aboriginal communities).
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ally undermined, leading to a need for explanation and justifica-
tion. Are there reasons to believe in states, if they are not simply
facts? Are the reasons for their creation still valid? What were the
reasons for their creation?
There are now close to 200 nation-states in the world, yet
there was no supra-national legal authority dictating the creation
of all of them."8 It is true that some states were created by colo-
nial powers, in a hierarchical kind of relationship, but no such
hierarchical relationship explains the existence of the colonizing
states themselves. States must therefore be grounded on an un-
derlying, normative argument, common to all of them, that justi-
fied their creation and maintenance. A tradition of positivist
thought had to develop prior to the development of positive law.
In this way there would be underlying common law, or ius pub-
licum, justifying the range of distinct states which emerged in Eu-
rope and the rest of the world.19 This tradition of common law
is not dumb; it speaks to the need and justification for legal sys-
tems, and is capable both of recognizing their weaknesses, their
need for reinforcement, and degrees of effectiveness in their im-
plementation. Western legal tradition is normative; it speaks to
questions which legal systems, as purported facts, are unable to
speak to. This is why Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union
speaks of the "constitutional traditions common to the Member
States," since it is necessary to resort to such underlying common
tradition as a means of critiquing and going beyond the national
systems of Europe. 20 There is therefore law prior to the state,
common to all states, which explains and justifies their existence.
The state is the result, not the source, of common law. This
common law is transnational in character, but the variety of
18. See Douglas Hurd, Diplomatic Answers, WORLD TODAY, Mar. 1, 2005, at 16.
19. For an overview of the development of the public law argument, and historical
references, see H. PATRICK GLENN, ON COMMON LAws 51-53 (2005) [hereinafter GLENN,
ON COMMON LAws] ("[G]ood case that the only single ius commune that Europe has
known is one of public law and not private law . .. a single, relational common law
which argued for, and allowed, the emergence of exclusivist national states."). See gener-
ally R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the lus Commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 297, 300-01
(1999) (defining ius commune as "the amalgam of the Roman and canon laws that gov-
erned legal education in European universities and influenced legal practice in Europe
from the twelfth century forward").
20. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 6, O.J. C. 325/5,
at 11-12 (2002).
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transnational law today requires further inquiry into the nature
and role of common law in the world.
II. TRANSNATIONAL COMMON LAWS
The expression "common law" is today thought to refer to
the English, or Anglo-American, or Commonwealth case-law tra-
dition.2' Historically, however, the English notion of common
law was a particular variant, with cases as its primary source, of a
much more widespread phenomenon of common law in Euro-
pean legal history.2 2 From the time of development of what we
know as the modern civil and common law traditions from the
twelfth century, the notion of common law was widely used as a
means of reconciling the emergent civil and common laws with
the particular local laws which they encountered in the course of
their expansion. 2' English common law thus expanded out from
Westminster, with its judges on horse or carriage, and was desig-
nated as the common law in order to distinguish it from the
many other laws of England which were not common, but which
were highly particular to the regions and even hamlets of En-
gland.24 There was thus a centuries-long dialogue between com-
mon law and non-common law (which could be so-called "cus-
tom," royal legislation, commercial law, or other) .25 The particu-
lar feature of common law was that it yielded to particular law,
seen as more imperative in local circumstances, more command-
ing, or more specialized. Even today the common law in En-
gland will yield to custom, which meets the contemporary re-
quirements of proof.26 Common law was therefore not binding
law, though it was clearly recognized as law. Its applicability, and
content, varied according to the particular encounters it had
with its particular interlocutors. Common law was therefore rela-
tional law, law which defined itself and its application in terms of
its constant and ongoing relations with other laws applicable
within the same territory. The notions of binding law and stare
21. See GLENN, ON COMMON LAWS, supra note 19, at vii-viii.
22. See id. at 1-44.
23. See id. at 12-14.
24. See id. at 26, 29-30.
25. See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVER-
srrv IN LAw 256 (2004) [hereinafter GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS].
26. See GLENN, ON COMMON LAws, supra note 19, at 30-31.
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decisis were creations of the mid-nineteenth century. 27
The other well-known common law is the ius commune, of
Roman legal origins, which was the object of major development
in continental European law Faculties from the twelfth cen-
tury.28 This too was known as a common law, in spite of its doc-
trinal (non-decisional) sources and great differences from the
common law, since it was common in comparison to the particu-
lar laws-the iura propria-which it encountered in the course of
its expansion.29 Like the English common law, it too (eventu-
ally) yielded to local law, and the great doctrinal authorities of
the civil law came, modestly, to state their views "saving a better
opinion. ' ° This common law, like that of England, did not pur-
port to "bind," but no one doubted its status as law nor its grow-
ing authority as such.
Less well known in legal history, largely because of the
screen of national codifications, are the common laws of France,
Spain, and Germany. In each case, a law considered as common
expanded in influence, yet in each case yielded to local, more
particular forms of normativity when it was clear that they were
equal, and even more appropriate, for the task.31 The Custom
of Paris, and the doctrinal commentaries upon it, were seen as
an "ideal" custom, supplementing all the many, and more mi-
nor, customs of France. 2 It was the basis of the French "droit
commun," which was the object of major treatises until the mid-
eighteenth century. Saxon customary law, in the form of the
Sachsenspiegel, spread east, south, and even west, as a useful
model for local laws which had not yet been developed into the
same extensive and written form.34 This was the German
"gemeine Recht." In Castille, Alfonso ("the Wise") wrote a model
text for laws in seven books (the "Siete Partidas"), which became a
27. SeeJim Evans, Change in the Doctrine of Precedent During the Nineteenth Century, in
PRECEDENT IN LAw 35, 68 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987).
28. See, e.g., Helmholz, supra note 19, at 300 (noting the influence of the ius com-
mune on European legal practice from the twelfth century).
29. See in particular FRANCESCO CALASSO, INTRODUZIONE AL DI-rTTO COMUNE 67-69
(1970).
30. R. H. HELMHOLZ, THE IUS COMMUNE IN ENGLAND: FOUR STUDIES 243 (2001).
31. See H. Patrick Glenn, The Common Laws of Europe and Louisiana, 79 TUL. L. REv.
1041 (2005) (discussing the multiplicity of European common laws and their interac-
tion in Louisiana).
32. See, e.g., JEAN GAUDEMET, LES NAISSANCES DU DROIT 176-77 (1997).
33. See id. (citing Frangois Bourjon's famous treatise, published in 1747).
34. See Glenn, supra note 31, at 1046-47.
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constant source of reference and supplement to the local laws of
what was eventually to become Spain.35 It was widely referred to,
in Castille and beyond, as a "derecho commtin." In all of these
cases as well, the common law yielded to local particularity and
local law, without in any case losing its co-equal status as law. No
one doubted, or at least effectively challenged, the idea that
there could be multiple sources of law, and multiple laws, appli-
cable on the same territory.
This distant European legal history remains highly relevant
to the contemporary debate on transnational law since these
common laws, now perceived as internal to European states, be-
came even more mobile with the expansion of European powers
beyond Europe itself. It is important to identify the source or
origin of this European expansion. It could not be said to be the
European states which we know today as France, Germany or
Spain, since these states achieved some form of legal cohesion
only from the nineteenth century. England was identifiable ear-
lier, but this was more due to geography than the unifying influ-
ence of the common law.
The common laws of Europe thus expanded overseas
largely during the time when they were still in a process of ex-
pansion within Europe itself. They expanded outwards from ma-
jor European centers-London, Paris, Madrid, and Amster-
dam-and only stopped their expansion when they reached re-
sistance (uti possidetis jur-is). French law, in the form of French
custom, arrived in New France in 1534, almost three centuries
before the French state became legally unified with the French
Civil Code.3 6 As a result, the common laws of Europe were com-
mon to territories beyond Europe as well as common to territo-
ries within Europe, and there were no clearly defined states to
set territorial limits to them. The English common law ex-
panded to Wales, Ireland, and Scotland, and this expansion was
still occurring when expansion began to take place in North
America.37 It was possible to speak of "The Indian as Irishman"
since the laws of both were being encountered and dealt with in
35. See id. at 1059-60.
36. See id. at 1054.
37. SeeJames Muldoon, The Indian as Irishman, ESSEX INST. HisT. COLLECTIONS 111
no. 4, 267, 267-68, reprinted in JAMES MULDOON, CANON LAW, THE ExPANsION OF EUROPE,
AND WORLD ORDER (1998).
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a comparable manner.3" They were both inseparable elements
of the same process of expansion outwards from European cen-
ters of authority and influence.
Almost from their inception, therefore, the common laws of
Europe were common laws of the world, and everywhere demon-
strated the same essential characteristic of a common law, that of
yielding to local forms of normativity. Local laws beyond Europe
were as difficult to displace as those of Europe, and nowhere in
the world has it been possible for European common laws to
displace, for example, the unwritten law of chthonic or indige-
nous peoples.39 Nor was it possible for the common laws of Eu-
rope to displace the law created for and by the European set-
tlers, who often rebelliously created their own "common law" in
opposition to that advanced by European authority.4 ° So in the
colonized world (the whole world, with rare exceptions), there
were multiple laws applicable within the same territory, just as
there were multiple laws applicable within the same territory in
Europe. At least one of these laws was a common law; the others
were particular laws, particular to a people, a place, and a do-
main of law. The process of choice of law was vast and impor-
tant, and enormous attention was given to the purported and
necessary reach of both particular and common laws, in particu-
lar subjects and for particular people. There was no territorial
uniformity, and this legal reality continued to prevail even
through most of the period of legal nationalism of the last two
centuries, in spite of the attention given by legal theory to the
process of state construction and state uniformity. In very few
jurisdictions of the world did national legislation bring about na-
tional legal uniformity.41
What effect did the measures of legal nationalization of the
38. Id. at 267. Also, for a discussion of the continuity between the Spanish Recon-
quista and the Spanish conquest of the Americas, and of how "this tradition" forms "a
unifying theme in Spanish history," see id., and for the early development of a "frontier
movement" within Europe, see DouGLAss C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN Eco-
NOMIC HISTORY 132 (1981).
39. See GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 25, at 80-84.
40. See PETER KARSTEN, BETWEEN LAW AND CUSTOM 4, 35, 186, 498, 529 (2002).
41. For a description of legal diversity within the civil law of France, even in the
late twentieth century, as revealed by computer analysis of numerous court decisions in
particular French judicial districts, see H. Patrick Glenn, The Use of Computers: Quantita-
tive Case Law Analysis in the Civil and Common Law, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 362 (1987)
(revealing regional forms of jurisprudence within France).
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nineteenth century-such as codification and national concepts
of stare decisis-have on the common laws of the world? It is an
important question for the concept of transnational law. What is
the reach of national law? It is everywhere recognized to be
purely territorial, in the absence of express legislative intention
otherwise and the means of giving judicial effect to that inten-
tion. So the jurisdictions of the world which gave rise to the
common laws of the world were themselves unable to control,
capture, or eliminate those common laws of the world by their
own territorial legislation. The common laws of the world thus
floated away from their original sources and, once liberated, be-
came impossible to control in their entirety. This became obvi-
ous with all of the common laws known within Europe, and even
with some of more recent vintage.42 English common law is thus
obviously today of transnational dimensions, and the transna-
tional 'judicial dialogue" in the so-called "common law world" is
today intensifying after a certain decline in the middle to late
twentieth century.4" The transnational character of continental
common laws continued to be evident in spite of the process of
national codification. The French Civil Code became the na-
tional law of France, purporting to be uniform in character, but
in much of the world (North and South America, Africa, South-
ern Europe, the Middle East, South-East Asia) became a source
and ongoing model for local legislators and judges. The norma-
tive force of the French Civil Code, as a common law, was ex-
traordinary, and all with no pretence of "binding" beyond
French territory. The Siete Partidas is still being cited by judges in
the South of the United States, to say nothing of Latin America,
since it continues to be recognized as law, though again with no
pretense of "binding.""
There are even world common laws which developed their
characteristics as such at the world level and not initially within
Europe. This is the case for what may be designated as "Pandec-
tist" common law, in the form of the enormous influence in the
world of nineteenth- and twentieth-century German doctrine
and legislation, which has been "received" in Japan, China,
42. See GLENN, ON COMMON LAWS, supra note 19, at 53-56.
43. GLENN, LEGAL TRADmONS, supra note 25, at 257-58.
44. See, e.g., DeSambourg v. Board of Comm'rs, 621 So. 2d 602, 606 (La. 1993)
(citing Las Siete Partidas as shaping the First Civil Code adopted by the Territory of
Orleans).
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Greece, the Mexican state of Quintana Roo, and many other
places.4 5 Roman-Dutch law is also the product of world expan-
sion of the law of the Dutch province of Holland, itself never a
common law within Europe, but still today a major transnational
common law.46
Under the influence of positivist and statist legal theory the
actual operation of these common laws of the world has often
been considered an extra-legal or sociological phenomenon.47
It is rather the simple continuation of operation of laws which
were never considered "binding" even at their inception, and
which have continued their influence and dialogical relationship
with particular laws, now including the "binding" laws of states,
throughout their entire historical existence. All of the state law
of the world thus nests within one or another of the common
laws of the world, which provide language, concepts, persuasive
authority, and models for judicial and legislative activity at the
level of individual states.
Common laws thus constitute the law prior to states, and law
which continues to nurture and support the legal endeavour
within all contemporary states. There are also, of course, rela-
tions between the common laws themselves, though these are
more difficult to trace and determine. They are relations of in-
fluence of non-binding laws, and the influence takes places
across languages, religions, and geography. They are not what is
often described today as "soft law," but rather what has always
been accepted as law, though it does not purport to bind.4"
45. See Rainer Grote, Comparative Law and Teaching Law Through the Case Method in
the Civil Law Tradition-A German Perspective, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 163, 165 (2005)
(noting that the Pandectist school's aim was the dogmatic and systematic study of Ro-
man material).
46. See, e.g., MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PROPERTY AND OB-
LIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA (Reinhard Zimmermann, Daniel Visser &
Kenneth Reid eds., 2004) (discussing how Roman-Dutch law, brought to South Africa
by the Dutch East India Company, was infused with and remolded in part by the com-
mon law of England).
47. See, e.g., PIERRE LEGRAND, FRAGMENTS ON LAW-AS-CULTURE 85 (1999) ("[T]he
decision to alter a local institutional framework at the level of formal rules, and to do so
through borrowing, is first and foremost a function of a cultural engagement ....");
Heinz Klug, Transnational Human Rights: Exploring the Persistence and Globalization of
Human Rights, 1 ANN. REv. OF L. & Soc. ScI. 85, 85 (2005) (describing a "socio-legal
approach" to human rights).
48. See Orly Lobel, Surreply: Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN.
L. REv. 498, 506 (2004) ("Primarily international and European legal scholars have
used the term 'soft law' to name the shift to governance as a whole."); see alsoJohn
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Transnational common laws thus contribute in a unique and im-
portant way to the laws of nation-states, and this dialogue is
matched by the dialogue which takes place amongst the com-
mon laws themselves.
III. THE DIALOGUE OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMON LAWS
How do common laws undertake a dialogue, however, with
the large, dumb animals which national legal systems would be,
according to positivist legal theory? How does one engage in
normative debate with a large and apparently silent fact? It does
involve a reconceptualization of state law, which can no longer
be seen as an unchallenged, autonomous social reality. Rather,
state law must be seen as an ongoing normative construction,
drawing support from all possible sources.49 It must be seen
again as it is and always has been, a particular, variable and con-
tingent instantiation of a common law, or even in some cases, of
common laws. The state is thus an informational node within a
larger body of normative information, or more precisely, legal
tradition.5" There is normative information within state law, as
all lawyers know, and it is not limited to the precise content of
particular rules. It also relates to the imperative or non-impera-
tive force of such rules, and the reasons for their application. If
such imperative force of state law can be found and justified, it
will prevail against the common law which serves as its founda-
tion and ongoing supplement. This is the teaching of all of the
common laws, but they remain constantly available in the face of
doubt as to the applicability, or adequacy, of particular (state)
laws.
The existence of a large field of non-imperative state law is
becoming clearer in the face of normative demands coming
from within and without the state. It reveals itself as classic ius
Packer, Making International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict: A Practioner's Perspec-
tive, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 715, 718 (2000) (commenting that the "hard" and
"soft" law distinction refers principally to the quality of the standards in terms of their
sources).
49. For a description of law as an ongoing inquiry, see H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive
Authority, 32 McGILL L.J. 261, 288 (1987) [hereinafter Glenn, Persuasive Authority]
("There is never a closing of sources, never a declaration of satisfaction with existing
knowledge, never a pure process of deduction from a single given, never an entire
commitment to an exclusive paradigm of law.").
50. See WALTER C. OPELLO, JR. & STEPHEN J. Rosow, THE NATION-STATE AND
GLOBAL ORDER: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCrION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITIcs 263 (2004).
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dispositivum, at the disposition of the parties but not to be im-
posed upon them. So there is a recognizable phenomenon of
"contractualization" of fields of law previously seen as fields of
state regulation, which may or may not have gone too far.51
What is essential is recognition of a field of law (whatever its
boundaries at a particular time) where state law itself acknowl-
edges its non-imperative, or even incomplete, character. Parties
are thus free to create their own law, to invoke the law of other
states (even in purely "internal" situations), or even to invoke
non-state law, which parties now do in constructing so-called "is-
lamic mortgages. '"52 state law does not exist as simple fact, silent
on the terms and conditions of its application. It gives reasons
for its application, or non-application, and the application of
common laws will vary according to state claims of imperativity."
Legal systems, as products of normative common law traditions,
thus share the normative character of those traditions. They
may claim factual existence, but this itself is a normative claim,
and in any event the boundaries and application of the system
are always subject to normative debate.
The vigor of the common laws of the world will thus vary
according to the claims of state law. This is part of the teaching
of common laws, which are thus self-effacing to the point of ap-
parent disappearance. Some states have entirely rejected the ap-
plication of law other than their own.54 All the law of such states
would be imperative. Party choice of foreign law is then "impos-
sible." Communist states have thus been radically territorial in
character, as were the "import substitution" states of Latin
America.5 There has also been great variation over time in
openness to common laws of particular states. In the nineteenth
51. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Ideology, Due Process and Civil Procedure, 67 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 265, 279 (1993) (discussing the contractualization of tort law); Jennifer
Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdependence, and Couples of the Same
Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 299-300 (discussing the contractualization of family law).
52. GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 25, at 184 (noting that islamic financing
is increasingly present in the world). For an overview of islamic financing, see generally
Gohar Bilal, Islamic Finance: Alternatives to the Western Model, Fletcher F. World Aff., Win-
ter-Spring 1999, at 145.
53. See Glenn, Transnational Concept, supra note 5, at 850 (noting that statist theory
is the result of a long Western tradition).
54. See id. at 859 (stating that where legal convergence is resisted, state law is often
conflictual in character).
55. See H. Patrick Glenn, Harmonization of Laws in the Ameyicas, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REv. 223, 229 (2003).
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century, many European states enacted provisions precluding re-
sort to foreign sources of law, and notably the doctrinal sources
of the ius commune upon which they had extensively relied in the
past. 6 The United states was extremely open to European com-
mon laws-of both English and continental origin-in the nine-
teenth century, went through a period of closure in the twenti-
eth, and is now opening again, though the immediate outlook is
not clear.5 7 This is a controversial process, but it is the case that
all parties to the debate rely on concepts which are rooted in
transnational common laws, the concept of the ongoing availa-
bility of common law, and the concept of priority of particular or
state law, to the extent of national invocation of it.
The variability of openness to common laws will also vary
according to particular fields of law. In some areas of law the law
of a particular state will be highly developed and there may well
be a period of apparent self-sufficiency. This is usually not of
long duration. Today, few if any states claim self-sufficiency and
existing ultimate solutions in fields of human rights, biotechnol-
ogy, industrial property, corporate governance, or even civil pro-
cedure.58 This explains the 'judicial dialogue" now taking place
in these fields, and the ongoing attention to legislative re-formu-
lations of existing law. Resort to "best practices" which are of
transnational origin is of course facilitated by common language
and common concepts, and this is what each transnational com-
mon law provides.59 In public law, communication is thus facili-
tated by "a similar conception of constitutional values.., certain
institutional arrangements as well as a particular interpretive
56. See GLENN, ON COMMON LAWS, supra note 19, at 46.
57. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme
Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Pen-
ally Decision, 47 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 743 (2005); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and
Identity: The Role of TransnationalJudicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International
Law, 93 GEORGETOWN L.J. 487 (2005); Gary JeffreyJacobsohn, The Permeability of Consti-
tutional Borders, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1763 (2004); Donald E. Childress III, Using Comparative
Constitutional Law to Resolve Domestic Federal Questions, 53 DuKE L.J. 193 (2003); Glenn,
Persuasive Authority, supra note 49, at 277; M. H. Hoeflich, Roman and Civil Law in Ameri-
can Legal Education and Research Prior to 1930: A Preliminary Survey, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV.
719 (1984); Peter Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA.
L. Rav. 403 (1966).
58. See Glenn, Transnational Concept, supra note 5, at 852 (stating that application
of state law must be justified in the face of alternative persuasive authority).
59. See id. at 856.
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methodology' 6° and all of this is inherent in the particular com-
mon law that is invoked, in case of need, by the actors of a partic-
ular state. They form part of a contemporary epistemic commu-
nity, by virtue of their adherence to a particular transnational
common law.
60. Lorraine E. Weinrib, Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism,
in DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 3, 4 (Vicki C. Jackson &
Mark Tushnet eds., 2002).
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